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Education and the Self 
MICHAEL BONNETT 
Institute of Education, University of London 
This short paper falls into three parts: 
I) a brief introduction that sketches a traditional view of the self; 
II) an outline of a view that rejects this understanding of the self and that, in very 
general terms, is taken to exemplify a growing strand in current thinking; 
III) a list of comments and questions that this view provokes. 
I 
Education is of necessity concerned with individual selves, but not necessarily 
respectfully. One reading of much contemporary educational practice is that its chief 
concern is to shape the selves of its learners in accordance with what are perceived 
to be current economic imperatives rather than, say, with what arises from their sense 
of their own existence. And whether or not this is true, much education is heavily 
conditioned by sets of standards and objectives determined quite independently of 
individual learners, and indeed, their teachers. With regard to respecting the self, this is 
not a promising situation. 
But what is the self? What, if anything is its value? And what would be involved in 
respecting it? 
I will begin by giving a characterisation of such matters drawn from English 
literature and that I take to convey something of our everyday view. In the novel Tess of 
the d 'Urbervilles Thomas Hardy tells the story of the developing and ultimately tragic 
relationship of the young parson's son Angel Clare and a farm-girl, Tess Durbeyfield. 
As their acquaintanceship grows, Clare is brought to consider the situation that is 
arising: 
Despite his heterodoxy, faults and weaknesses, Clare was a man with a conscience. 
Tess was no insignificant creature to toy with and dismiss; but a woman living her 
precious life-a life which to herself who endured or enjoyed it, possessed as great 
a dimension as the life of the mightiest to himself. Upon her sensations the whole 
world depended to Tess; through her existence all her fellow creatures existed, to 
her. The universe itself only came into being for Tess on the particular day in the 
particular year in which she was born. 
This consciousness upon which he had intruded was the single opportunity of 
existence ever vouchsafed to Tess by an unsympathetic First Cause-her all; her 
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every and only chance. How then should he look upon her as of less consequence 
than himself; as a pretty trifle to caress and grow weary of; and not deal with the 
greatest seriousness with the affection which he knew that he had awakened in her-
so fervid and impressionable as she was under her reserve; in order that it might not 
agonize and wreck her? (Hardy, 1992, pp. 178-179) 
Here we have an eloquent expression of a sense of the self of another and the 
responsibilities it entails. The self portrayed here has a number of salient interrelated 
features: 
it is enduring, having its own life, identity; 
while shaped by its environment, it is not simply some sort of concrescence of that 
environment-it has an internal unity of its own and therefore a perspective on the 
world that is unique; 
it has feelings and a basic apprehension of its own existence-its experiences have 
the quality of 'mineness' and of privacy; 
it is finite, having only one life to live and this life is the sum of all that is possible for 
that individual; 
in these regards it is therefore worthy of a respect that cannot simply be trumped by 
the desires of another; 
a sense of responsibility pervades the self and it relationships. 
The conception of self portrayed here sits loosely in the tradition of liberal-humanist 
theory of an on-going pre-existing self that lies at the centre of its world. And 
this shares something of a Cartesian turn in that the direction of movement for 
meaning-giving and for the disclosure of the self is from the inner to the outer, from the 
private to the public. While this conception has had a strong following in educational 
debate (e.g. notably in strands influenced by Romanticism), it is periodically challenged 
-often in ways that essentially seek to reverse this flow of meaning-giving from inner 
to outer. 
It is just such a current challenge that I wish to discuss today. 
II 
In a number of recent educational texts we are invited to see the self as constituted 
by factors that are external to it, and as possessing little or no internally maintained 
steady identity. For example there are those influenced by Michel Foucault and Judith 
Butler who see individual subjectivities as heavily and continuously constituted by 
discourse and the performative utterances and gestures of others, or who, influenced 
by Hannah Arendt and Emmanuel Levinas, see us as constantly entering the world by 
the grace of others who give us meaning. Here the direction of flow of meaning-giving 
and disclosure is from the outer to the inner. It is the 'other' that lies at the centre. It 
is my intention in this short paper to begin to open up some of the issues raised by 
such a flow reversal by referring to one well worked through example of its portrayal 
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in an educational context: the book recently published by professor Gert Biesta called 
Beyond Learning: Democratic Education for a Human Future. Here, in the context of 
education, Biesta asks how we should conceive the subjectivity of the learner. 
In what initially one might judge to be a rather Heideggerian stance, he expresses an 
interest in the opportunities that educational institutions offer for individuals to 'come 
into presence' and sets out as his central premise that this coming into presence occurs 
when we initiate actions that are taken up by others who are capable of initiating their 
own actions. 'Action' here is meant in a particular sense taken from Hannah Arendt: 
namely as 'the only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary 
of things or matter' -and through which by taking the initiative, beginning something 
anew, we reveal our unique personal identities (p. 47). 
But it must be noted that this is not the revelation of some pre-existing identity-
the self only becomes clear for the other and for the self in the action. This makes the 
domain of action-and therefore coming into presence-boundless and inherently 
unpredictable. It always entails risk. We come into presence in a world of ever-arising 
beginnings and beginners. To initiate or pursue our own beginnings we always have 
to rely on the actions of these other beginners. Hence, coming into presence means 
coming into a world of plurality and difference. Although, in a sense, this situation 
frustrates the 'purity' of our beginning, following Arendt, this 'impossibility to remain 
unique masters of what [we] do' is at the very same time the condition-and the only 
condition-under which our beginnings can ever come into the world. Action, as 
distinguished from fabrication, is never possible in isolation. Arendt argues that 'to be 
isolated is to be deprived of the capacity to act ... ' (p. 84). 
The concern throughout is with the coming into the world of unique, singular beings. 
This however should not be confused with mere self-expression, for our coming 
into the world is thoroughly relational. It involves entering the social fabric and thus 
responding to-and being responsible for-what and who is other, the question of 
the other and the other as a question. Overall this entails elements of passivity such 
as listening and attentiveness on the part of the learner and a certain violation of the 
sovereignty of the learner as they are challenged by difficult questions and difficult 
encounters entailed in entering a community of, as Biesta puts it, 'those who have 
nothing in common'. That is to say, those of whom one is to assume nothing, can know 
nothing, for presuming to anticipate others' beginnings would be to reify them and is 
necessarily hegemonic. This all means that education-along with all other genuine 
human interaction-is inherently difficult and at times discomforting. And for the 
teacher there is the additional challenge of responsibility without knowledge, for she 
must take responsibility for the subjectivity of a learner that she does not and, indeed, 
cannot know. 
In general, the educational response has to be one of openness to different ways of 
being human; it therefore has to be experimental and experiential. The question of 
the humanity of human beings has to be taken up as a practical question, a question 
that requires a response with every new manifestation of subjectivity (p. 106). It is 
not something to be determined by some pre-existing notion of human essence that 
posits a norm of humanness. The key question in genuinely human encounters is not 
what is present but who is present. It requires the maintenance of what Biesta calls a 
'worldly space' through which new beginnings can come into presence. We always act 
upon beings who are not only capable of their own actions but whose coming into the 
world depends as much on our response as our coming into the world depends on their 
responses (p. 107). For, to quote Biesta: 
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If I would begin something, but no one would respond, nothing would follow from 
my initiative, and, as a result, my beginnings would not come into the world and I 
would not be a subject. I would not come into the world. When, on the other hand, I 
begin something and others do take up my beginnings, I do come into the world, and 
in precisely this moment I am a subject (p. 133). 
Here we have a way of thinking about our being with others in which plurality is not 
conceived as something to be overcome so that common action can become possible, 
but that makes our own being and our being with others possible and real in the first 
place. 
Our coming into the world structurally relies on the activities of others to take up our 
beginnings, yet others will always do so in their own, unpredictable ways (p. 92). 
Such occurrences are stymied by participating in 'strong (i.e. norm-governed) 
communities' such as a rational community, for here one slips into becoming a mere 
representative of its categories and norms rather than being a unique individual. 
On this view, then, our being-with-others is primordial in that we are with others 
before we are with ourselves and it is ethical in that (following Levinas) it is 
characterized by a primordial responsibility-a responsibility that is older than the ego 
and that is not a matter of our choice, but is already identified from outside: we are 
called to be a responsible self. And the call is not to human being in general, it is me 
who is called by the other. The subject as a unique and singular being, as a 'oneself', 
comes into presence because it finds itself in a situation where it cannot be replaced 
by anyone else (Levinas). As Adrian Peperzak puts it: 'I am hostage to the other and 
nobody can replace me in this service'. My subjectivity is a subjection to the other: for 
Levinas, 'the subject is subject' (p. 52). 
While certainly it is not the sole task of education to maintain a space where freedom 
to come into presence can occur; it is one central task. This space will need to be one 
of encounter and difference-the ideal educational space will have the urban qualities 
found in Herman Hertzberger's conception of the 'city'-a space where we 'are 
continually preoccupied with measuring, mirroring and pitting ourselves against each 
other' because 'it is not we that determine who we are, but mainly others'. The 'aim' 
of the city is therefore 'to provide the opportunity for us to inspect, assess, keep an eye 
on and bump into one another' (p. 112). On this view we need schools built to facilitate 
such encounters that constitute the 'worldly space' in which we can come to presence 
as unique individuals. 
III 
It seems to me that the idea of a self as a coming to presence through initiating action 
taken up by others is seminal in a number of respects. 
It emphasises the relational nature of subjectivity and how growing as a subject is 
enriched by diversity of encounter, disruption and difficulty. True education is not a 
comfortable business. It is not about indulging the proclivities of some pre-existing 
fixed self. And I heartily agree that the role of educational institutions is not to 
determine individual selves through some heavily prescribed curriculum, but to create 
a space where, indeed, in some sense they can come into presence (See Bonnett, 1976, 
1978). 
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It also addresses a very pressing question: How to live with others who, in many 
significant respects, are not like us? Clearly this is an issue of ever-growing importance 
as societies become more multi-cultural, and in the context of the evermore significant 
global society where we constantly encounter difference and the need to work with 
it. Biesta's account seems to provide a rather neat response by claiming that the other 
is a necessary condition of our own corning into the world and that we have a non 
self-chosen fundamental responsibility to respect the other, enable it to corne into the 
world. Though the subjectivity of the other is something essentially unpredictable and 
beyond our control, we depend upon it for our own subjectivity. Hence, essentially 
education is imbued with a sense of the unknown rather than the known. Again, this 
latter seems to me to be very healthy attitude. 
And certainly there is something highly persuasive about the key notion that takes 
seriously that human existence is 'being-with' and that the significance of our selves 
must at least in part be the product of the diversity of ways in which our initiations 
are taken up by others. Indeed, there would appear to be something stultifying about 
a life in which ones intentions ruled absolutely, ones plans were never disrupted, 
ones expectations never confounded, where routine ruled supreme, no difference or 
disruption ever occurring. A life insulated from all contingency, unpredicatability and 
uncertainty-a life devoid of risk-would be a severely impoverished life.-Perhaps 
no life at all. 
But what is it to corne into the world-to 'corne into presence'? Does it simply mean 
to have ones actions taken up by other agents? Are there not other ways in which ones 
subjectivity can receive recognition? And does the account say enough about the way 
in which others take up ones beginnings, from what perspective? Furthermore, exactly 
what is one to be open to in responding to another if the meaning of any action is in 
such a strong sense always deferred? Let me refine these concerns through a series of 
more specific points. 
On the point of what is necessary for us to corne into presence: can I not corne into 
presence for myself in moments of self-awareness, and if so, in what sense do I require 
the otherness of others? It is one thing to make this requirement a formal one in the 
sense that in principle the recognition of myself-me-requires a public language and 
culturally produced horizons of significance, and these are the product of others. It is 
quite another thing to make it an empirical or occurent requirement-empirically my 
actions must be recognized by others on every occasion for me to corne into presence 
on that occasion, as Biesta does. 
And regarding this latter, while it is certainly true that one may experience a 
heightened sense of self-awareness when one feels oneself to be in the presence of 
others-one might indeed become, as we say, 'self-conscious' -equally there can 
be occasions when for some at least, solitude is as, if not more, effective in this 
regard. This also invites the question as to whether the other in its otherness is always 
engendering of self-revealing rather than self-concealment-even when the other does 
not seek domination, but is simply making its own responsive 'beginning', but which 
might be experienced as in some sense threatening. 
Furthermore, are there not experiences of corning into presence in relation to the 
natural world-both in terms of a certain quality of being that can be experienced by 
the individual, and the quality of the entry into the world of nature as quintessentially 
'other'? A towering anthropocentrism seems to run through the account. 
Such considerations lead to the question: Is Biesta privileging the perspective of 
a particular 'cosmopolitan', 'urban', perhaps, 'extroverted' personality type in his 
account? A thought lent weight by the characteristics of Hertzberger's city that he uses 
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to exemplify the qualities of a worldly space. 
In what sense can the stranger's recognition bring one into presence in a fuller 
way than one's neighbour or friend-i.e. subjectivities characterized by what they 
share with you, what they have in common with you? Perhaps the stranger sees a 
new 'angle', but what of depth and intensity? Might not one who, say, is understood 
as having shared a traumatic experience with you, be able to recognize and respond 
to aspects of you-affirm you-in a way that 'those who have nothing in common' 
cannot. Of course it would be presumptuous, and seriously limiting of subjectivity, if 
others attempt to define one by such things that they think they share with you. But 
this is not what is being said. The point is that someone characterized as friend may 
be better able to recognize your action for what it is than those with whom you have 
'nothing in common'. 
Or is the idea of identifying an action for 'what it is' one of the ideas that this view 
wants to challenge on the ground that its meaning is always deferred? Certainly 
there are references to 'the death of the author' in this regard. But surely what the 
initiator intended by her action is not to be completely dismissed in characterizing it? 
What it meant to her, is an important aspect of its being her action, an act of unique 
self-expression, having the quality of 'mineness' . 
But perhaps an even more fundamental question is now raised: To what extent 
is 'everyday phenomenology' of the above kind relevant to the argument? Does its 
claim to be deeply structural (say on a par with Heidegger's ontological existentials 
of Being and Time?) render it immune to such criticisms? Just how plausible it for the 
view to claim such a position? In Being and Time, Heidegger shows how his ontology 
accommodates such considerations-indeed, that it is a necessary condition of such 
everyday phenomenology. Such a demonstration is not in evidence in Biesta's book. 
My overall point is that we need to look very carefully at the nature of the argument 
concerning the relationship between coming into presence and a world of otherness and 
difference if its potential insights are not to be vitiated by potential distortions. 
Then there is the intimately related matter of banishing the idea of a human essence. 
This now is an oft-encountered sentiment. But should the quarrel be not so much with 
the idea of a human essence per se as with totalizing versions of what this might be? 
And does not Biesta's account of humanness itself assume or extol a particular version 
of human essence?-As at the least, initiator of action? And I suspect rather more if 
one scratches its surface. 
Of course, this query might tempt the rejoinder that we are straying into empty 
semantics: he is using the term 'essence' in one way and I another. But there is 
something substantive at stake here: either it is legitimate to say that when we speak of 
a human being we refer to an entity that, for example, is capable of thought and feeling, 
has some sense of self-awareness and responsibility for its actions, or it is not. If it is 
not, how in the first place do we set about identifying those entities that we encounter 
in the world that are deserving of the particular responsiveness that we should extend to 
human beings? (Should we extend it to robots that might simulate the overt behaviours 
we normally associate with human beings?) 
Does the displacement of the idea of a grounding identity from the idea of 
subjectivity by a focus on spontaneity and openness to the other raise issues for the idea 
of authenticity? How is my openness to be distinguished from that of someone else? 
Are we in danger of being left with a sea of essentially ephemeral, un-rooted, actions? 
Sober reflection on ones history-the sediments of ones previous experiences and ones 
track record concerning particular issues-may play an important role in becoming an 
authentic subject. 
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What, too, of the possibility that what one takes to be one's openness-one's 
spontaneous action-is little more than a reflection of what Heidegger (1973) has 
called the 'they-self'? A danger enhanced by an encouragement to read oneself off from 
the ways ones actions are taken up by others at large, which might in fact be 'crowd' 
responses? Heidegger provides an array of cautions concerning being grounded in such 
publicness. Overall, does Biesta's account, with its eschewal of the idea of identity, 
render redundant all such issues of being true to one's self? 
Biesta criticizes humanism for having too limiting (i.e. reifying) an understanding 
of what it is to be human, but does not his view result in a very thin conception of 
subjectivity, attenuated, strung out across the myriad beginnings of others? Plurality 
in those who take up one's beginnings will mean that they will get taken up in a 
wider range of ways-that one comes into presence more richly in the sense of more 
diversely-but also perhaps thereby more superficially. And ultimately what is the 
point of it?-Ofbecoming dispersed in such a way? What regard would and should we 
have for the 'other' conceived merely as passing actions rather than someone with an 
enduring identity? What are we to make of an individual whose existence is conceived 
only in terms of what we and others attribute to her actions and how we take them up 
-i.e. has no identity independently of this? 
Furthermore, is not an individual's recognition of another's action as one that does 
indeed take up her beginning an issue? What counts as taking up someone else S 
beginning? How are we to know when it has or hasn't (perhaps, despite appearances) 
happened? Whose story is to be privileged? And if none is, if ultimately anything 
can count as taking up someone's action, does not the idea become vacuous? Talk of 
'responsibility' for the other, listening to them responsively, similarly eddies off into a 
disconnected circularity if the 'meaning' of the action amounts to no more than how a 
stranger takes it (up), however sincerely. 
Returning now to the specifically educational context. Doesn't education need to 
have aims-a sense of what it is worthwhile introducing pupils to-inviting them to 
participate in-and what counts as their development as person? That is, doesn't it 
involve a sense of 'strong community'? Participation in such worthwhile activities is 
not something to be juxtaposed to coming into presence, but rather something to be 
understood as an essential part of it. I have in mind here Michael Oakeshott's (1972) 
claim that self-disclosure and self-enactment occur through engagement with a civilised 
inheritance of enduring traditions of thinking. A view that separates development 
of self-coming into presence-from initiation into a strong community of cultural 
discourse would seem to herald a certain solipsism of its own. 
Finally, a summative comment: in its emphasis on the diffuseness, transience, 
ephemeralism and sheer contingency of the occurrence of subjectivity through initiating 
action taken up by others, I wonder if its dismissal of reification and essentialism is 
achieved at the expense of anything sufficiently centred to be intelligible as a 'self'. 
NOTE 
Unless otherwise stated, all page references are to Biesta, 2006. 
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